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supplemental instruction, but did not supply them with a written
copy of such instruction (R. 85). Defense counsel informed the
Court that she did not think such an instruction was appropriate,
but that she needed time to research the issue (R. 83).
At 5:35 p.m., the judge recalled the jury.

He spent

approximately eight minutes giving the members of the jury a
supplemental oral instruction (R. 340-342)(Addendum A).

He did not

read a written instruction to the jury; instead, he made a series of
remarks to the group (R. 85, R. 340-342).

The Court informed the

jury that:
We are going to talk to you concerning this and
ask you to go back in the jury room and
deliberate and reach a decision concerning this
matter;
That you have been given sufficient evidence
to be able to make a decision (R. 340).
While the Court attempted to temper his statements by
telling the jurors to make a decision based on independent judgment,
and not to violate their consciences, he went on to instruct them
that
"these are the decisions that are made every day
in the criminal judicial system. And that is the
purpose of the jury is to face the issue and make
the decision. It is not the purpose of the jury
to avoid making the hard decision" (R. 340).
The judge addressed the foreman, informing him that if the
jury had a question as to procedure or needed clarification of a
point of law, the Court would entertain a question (R. 341). The
foreman responded "It is all clear" (R. 341).
The judge continued his comments, then sent the jury back
to deliberations at 5:43 p.m. with the statement "after discussing
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POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION GIVEN THE JURY DENIED
APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL,
After deliberating for approximately four hours, the jury
notified the judge that they were at an impasse and unable to reach
a decision (R. 340-341).

The judge recalled the members and made a

series of oral remarks, instructing them that they were to return to
the jury room and reach a decision (See Addendum A).

The judge

informed the jury foreman that he would answer any legal or
procedural questions, if that were what was causing the difficulty.
The foreman responded "It is all clear" (R. 341).
A.

THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL
INSTRUCTIONS AFTER A JURY ANNOUNCES ITS INABILITY
TO REACH A VERDICT.

In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the United
States Supreme Court upheld the giving of a supplemental instruction
to a jury which had reached an impasse.

As the Utah Supreme Court

acknowledged in a footnote in the recent case of State v. Medina, 56
U.A.R. 17,

P.2d

(Utah 1987),

"In the years since Allen was decided, many
courts have expressed concern about the continued
propriety of the instruction because of its
perceived tendency to pressure jurors to give up
their sincere convictions simply because a
majority takes a different view" (citations
omitted).
Id. at 19 (footnote 1).
The controversy surrounding the "dynamite" or Allen charge
focuses on the coercive nature of such instructions and the
resulting deprivation of a fair trial where jurors are pressured
-4 -
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in forming or reexamining their views on the issues before them or
(2) states or implies that if the jury fails to agree the case will
necessarily be retried" Id, at 1006 (Addendum D).

In a lengthy

discussion, that court pointed out:
we find that Allen-type instructions have been
subjected to a withering barrage of attacks,
largely on the grounds they are coercive or
inaccurate. Although no opinion of the United
States Supreme Court has addressed a challenge to
this charge since the original Allen case, 3
federal circuits and at least 22 states have
disapproved the instruction. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1002-1003.
The Gainer court also pointed out that the American Bar Association
recommends that courts not use the instruction A

The ABA recommends

that if the jury appears to be deadlocked, the Court may give or
repeat an instruction similar to the instruction set forth in
Addendum E.

1 The Gainer Court pointed out in footnote 9:

In so recommending, the American Bar Association
(ABA) promulgated the following standard:
"5.4 Length of deliberations: deadlocked jury.
"(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation,
the court may give an instruction which informs
the jury:
"(i) that in order to return a verdict, each
juror must agree thereto;
"(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one
another and to deliberate with a view to reaching
an agreement, if it can be done without violence
to individual judgment;
"(iii) that each juror must decide the case for
himself, but only after an impartial
consideration of the evidence with his fellow
jurors;

-6 -

In the present case, Mr. Kotz contends that after the jury
informed the Court that it had reached an impasse, and clarified
that the deadlock was based on an inability to agree on a verdict
and was not on a procedural or legal question, the Court should not
have given a supplemental instruction to the jury or, at the very
most, any supplemental instruction should have been similar to that
recommended by the American Bar Association.

The Court had given a

similar instruction at the close of the evidence (Addendum E) and a
repetition of such instruction after the jijiry announced its deadlock
is the maximum comment by a judge which should be tolerated.
Permitting a trial judge to say anything other than a repetition of
the instruction set forth in Addendum E aft^er determining that the
jurors cannot agree on a verdict opens the door for abuse and gives
rise to a situation such as this where a ttfial judge makes a series
of comments not previously set forth for counsel, emphasizing the

1 (cont) "(iv) that in the course of delib^rations, a juror should
not hesitate to reexamine his own v iews and change his
opinion if convinced it is errone^u s; and
"(v) that no juror should surrend0r his honest conviction
as to the weight or effect of the e vidence solely because
of the opinion of his fellow jurors , or for the mere
purpose of returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court th^t the jury has been
unable to agree, the court may recju ire the jury to continue
their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction
as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require
or threaten to require the jury tq> deliberate for an
unreasonable length of time or foif unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged wit^h out having agreed upon a
verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable
probability of agreement." (ABA #r oject on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, Std s. Relating to Trial by
Jury (Approved Draft 1968) std. 5 4 )
-7 -

need and desirability for the jury to reach a decision and
chastising the jury for its failure to do so.

Such a situation

should not be permitted/ and by rejecting such supplemental
instructions or outlining a clear approach for trial courts this
court would diminish the potential for the existence of such
situations.
B.

THE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION WAS COERCIVE.

Various courts have addressed the coercive nature of
supplemental instructions.

In Jenkins v. United States, supra,

after approximately two hours of deliberations, the jury indicated
that they were unable to agree on a verdict because of insufficient
evidence.

The judge recalled the jury and informed the members,

"You have got to reach a decision in this case."

Id. at 446. The

United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that in
its context and under all of the cirucmstances, the judge's
supplemental instruction was coercive.

Id.

The coercive effect of a supplemental instruction to the
jury was also considered in State v. Roberts, 642 P.2d 858 (Ariz.
1982), where the court held that the coercive impact of instructions
would be evaluated under the "totality of the circumstances"
standard, based on the particular facts of each case.

Id. at 860.

Applying that standard, the court found that the "Allen" instruction
used was not coercive because the judge merely inquired into the
numerical standing of the jury and commented that the jury would
have to examine numerous facts before reaching a verdict.
861.

-8 -

Id. at

In People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997 (Calif. 1977), the
California Supreme Court acknowledged that reversible error would be
found when excessive pressure was placed upon the jury to reach a
verdict (Addendum D).

Id. at 1005.

The Ciurt in Gainer found that

a judge's statement that "the case must at some time be decided",
implied that a mistrial would result in a retrial.

Id. at 1006.

The court held that because such an "instruction misstated the law,
the court erred in giving that portion of the charge."

Id.2

In the case at bar, the trial judcje specifically requested
that the jury "reach a decision."

(R. 340}. He stated, "these are

the decisions that are made every day in the criminal judicial
system.

The purpose of the jury is to face the issue and make the

decision", suggesting that it would be improper for the jury to
cause a mistrial.

(R. 340)

He further chastised the jury, stating

"(i)t is not the purpose of the jury to avoid making a hard
decision."

Judge Wilkinson also commented on the evidence when he

stated that the jury had "been given sufficient evidence to be able
to make a decision." (R. 340)

While he adfised the jury members not

to violate their consciences, in the same breath he stated that
"these are the decisions that are made every day in the criminal
judicial system." (R. 340). In both Gainer and Thomas such
statements did not save the instructions, ifior should they in the
present case.

2

In People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997 (Calif* 1977), the courtfs
decision was based on two controversial features of the "Allen"
charge. The first element criticized was "the discriminatory
admonition directed to minority jurors to Rethink their position in
light of the majority's views." Id. at 1002.
-9 -

When asked whether the jury had procedural questions, the
foreman responded "It is all clear".

This exchange clarifies that

the problem causing the impasse was differing views among the jurors
as to the weight of the evidence and its effect on their verdict,
and not a legal or procedural question.

Under the totality of the

circumstances in this case, the supplemental instruction was
coercive and pressured the jury into reaching a verdict.
Cases reaching a contrary result are distinguishable.

In

Farmer v. State, 603 P.2d 700 (Nev. 1979), the court held that the
bailiff's comment to the jury that they continue deliberating did
not constitute a coercive "Allen" charge.

Unlike the situation

before this court, the judge in Farmer did not even address the
jury.

In State v. Villafuerte, 690 P.2d 42 (Ariz. 1984), the court

applied the totality of the circumstances standard and found that
the judge's order that the jury report for another day of
deliberations was not coercive, especially where it was tempered by
the judge's statement that, "It is not my province to say you must
or must not arrive at a verdict."

Id. at 49.

In the case at bar, where the judge made a series of oral
comments rather than reading a written instruction, asked the jurors
to reach a decision, chastised them for avoiding a hard decision and
failing to make a decision which is made daily and commented on the
evidence by telling the jury that sufficient evidence existed to
reach a decision, the judge pressured the jury into reaching a
decision and thereby committed reversible error.

The foreman's

clarification that the jury did not have a procedural or legal
-10-

question emphasized that the jury in this c^ase was unable to reach a
unanimous decision, but was pressured into making one by the court.
The judge's comments during his coercive remarks that they must
still follow their consciences and make independent decisions failed
to undo the damage done by the coercive statements.

Because the

judge gave coercive supplemental instructions to the jury, Mr. Kotz
was denied his right to a fair trial and the conviction should be
reversed.
C.

THE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN WITHOUT
NOTICE TO COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
provides:
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such
earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any
party may file written request th^t the court
instruct the jury on the law as s^t forth in the
request. At the same time copies of such
requests shall be furnished to the other
parties. The Court shall inform qrounsel of its
proposed actions upon the request} and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that
such instructions may be given orally, or
otherwise waive this requirement.
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-19(a)(1953 as amende^).
According to the general provisions of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the rules are to "govern the procedure in all
criminal cases in the courts of this state* for the purpose of
securing "simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and
the elimination of unnecessary expense and delay."
§77-35-l(b)(1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann.

The purpose of the rules cannot be
-11-

fulfilled when judges fail to adhere to the provisions.

If judges

are allowed to give surprise instructions, court proceedings are
complicated by objections and curative instructions.

Additionally,

the goal of "fairness in administration" demands that all defendants
should have notice of the exact content of instructions to the jury,
especially if the instruction itself is unusual, as is the case with
the "Allen" charge.
The recent Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Medina,
56 U.A.R. 17,

P.2d

(Utah 1987), emphasizes the importance of

following the dictates of Rule 19(a).

In that case, the trial court

provided counsel with a written instruction prior to instructing the
jury.

Where defense counsel knew the contents of the instruction

and stated that she had no objection, the Utah Supreme Court refused
to review the instruction because counsel's explicit "No objection"
reflected possible trial strategy.
In the case at bar, Judge Wilkinson did not provide counsel
with copies of the instruction he intended to give the jury.

The

record indicates that counsel did not waive this requirement.
Defense counsel did not know the exact nature of the judge's remarks
until he made them.

In addition, since the judge made a series of

comments, rather than reading an instruction, he was able to
emphasize certain words and statements that he would not have been
emphasized had he been reading.
Presenting the instruction in this manner violated Rule
19(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Had defense counsel

known the exact nature of the charge prior to the judge giving it,

-12-

she might have successfully challenged the instruction.

Instead,

the error resulted in prejudice to Mr. Kot? since the judge gave an
instruction suggesting that the jurors should be able to reach a
decision in a situation where they had already reported that they
were at an impasse.
D.

A FAILURE BY THIS COURT TO REVIEW THIS ISSUE
WOULD RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE.

Mr. Kotz contends that the issue Should be considered on
appeal even though defense counsel did not object on the record when
Judge Wilkinson delivered the "Allen" instruction.

In State v.

Randall, 353 P.2d 1054 (Mont. 1960), the court granted a new trial
after holding that because the judge failed to advise counsel of the
supplemental instruction in advance the defendant did not have an
opportunity to object.
Much of the instruction . . . was harmless.
Defendant did not know of the harmful portion of
the instruction until after it was given and of
course it was too late to make an objection. The
harm had already been done. Because of the
giving of this instruction a new irial should be
granted.
Id. at 1058.
Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of
the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury i$ instructed,
stating distinctly the matter to which he objects
and the ground of his objection. Not
withstanding a party's failure to object/ error
may be assigned to instructions ih order to avoid
a manifest injustice. (emphasis $dded)
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-19 (1982).
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court held in State v.
Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976), that where there is a "substantial
-13-

likelihood that an injustice has resulted" a defendant is excused
for failing to object to an erroneous instruction.

Id. at 192-92.

The recent Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Medina, supra,
is distinguishable.

While Medina involved an "Allen" charge, the

instruction was given pursuant to Rule 19.

The trial judge had

distributed a copy of the instruction to both the prosecution and
the defense and inquired if either side had objections.

Defense

counsel stated that she had no objection to the instruction.

The

Court, in holding that the "manifest injustice" exception under
19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure had not been met,
stated:
It is true that in reliance on this provision, we
have considered the propriety of instructions
with respect to which an objection has not been
met below. However, uniformly these have been
situations where counsel for the party
complaining on appeal merely remained silent at
trial.
Id. at 3.

Thus,the Court noted an important distinction between a

silent record and a statement that the party had no objection.
In the case at bar, the Court held an in chambers
discussion with counsel prior to giving the instruction (R. 82).
During that discussion, defense counsel expressed her concern about
the propriety of giving a "dynamite" charge to the jury (R. 83).
Once back in the courtroom, the court did not ask defense counsel if
she had any objections to the instruction.

Since the judge did not

give counsel a written instruction on which to base any objection,
and because the instruction he ultimately made was a series of oral
remarks rather than a specific, delineated instruction, counsel was

-14-

not informed of the exact nature of the instruction until after the
judge gave it to the jury.
Immediately after the trial, defease counsel filed a motion
for new trial ba£ed on the improper charge^

This situation is in

direct contrast to that Medina where defence counsel expressly
informed the couft that she had read the instruction and had no
objection to it.
Failing to review the instruction in this case would result
in manifest injustice to Mr. Kotz since th£ instruction pressured a
deadlocked jury into convicting him.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons,

the Appellant,

Randall Edward Kotz, seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of
his case to the district court with an ord£r for either a new trial
or dismissal of the charges.
Respectfully submitted, this

/^ (

day of May, 1987.
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DEBRAK? LOY
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, DEBRA K. LOY, hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
day of May, 1987.
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(Recess).
(The jury returned to the courtroom at 5:35 p.m.)
THE COURT:

The record may show that all

members of the jury are present in the courtroom.
Members of the jury the bailiff informed me that
you indicated to him that you have not yet reached a decision
in this matter and have indicated that you are either at an
impasse or in a situation where you do not feel you may be
able to reach a decision.

I must infoirm you that we are going

to talk to you concerning this and ask you to go back in the
jury room and deliberate and reach a decision concerning this
matter;
That you have been given s|ufficient evidence to be
able to make a decision;
That you have to discuss this with each other,
discuss the views and opinions of how each one of the jurors
saw this and you must go over it and go over it until you are
able to see just exactly what the evidence is and then make
your independent judgment.
We do not ask you to violate your conscience, but
we do indicate to you that these are the decisions that are
made every day in the criminal judicial system.

And that is

the purpose of the jury is to face th^ issue and make the
decision.

It is not the purpose of the jury to avoid making

the hard decision.
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 84107 RES. 266-032(
COURTS BLDG 240 E 4 S (801) 535-737:
231 JUDGE BUILDING OFF. 533-0800
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111

23
Now I assume that you did elect one of your group
as foreman.

And are you the foreman, sir?
JUROR WORTHEN: (Nods his head).
THE COURT:

I do not want to open this UD to

question and answer, but I will indicate to you, sir, that if
there is anything that is particularly bothering you as to
procedure or as to a clarification of a point of law, then we
may entertain a question.

We would not discuss with you or

entertain any questions concerning clarification of any evidence or any discussion with you as to how we see the evidence
You are the only ones that can discuss that and you've got to
see the evidence yourself and discuss it among yourselves. BuJ
if it is a question of procedure or something of that nature
then of course we would entertain a question.
JUROR WORTHEN:
THE COURT:

It is all clear.

Then based on that, and I realize

it is past five ofclock now, but of course it is not unusual
for us to continue late into the evening in deliberating on
cases.

So we at this time are going, with those instructions

are now going to ask you to return to the jury room, to get
down to the basics of the evidence right from the first individual that testified and go over the testimony and discuss it
as to how each of you saw it, and weigh that testimony, weigh
the credibility, the believability of each witness, and look
at the various statements to see how they meet with your

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 84107 RES. 266-0320
COURTS BLDG 240 E 4 S (801)535-7372
231 JUDGE BUILDING OFF 533-0800
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
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scrutiny and whether the statements were corroborated with
other credible evidence.

And after discussing them and facing

those issues we would then hope that you would reach a fair
and impartial decision without in an^f way violating your conscience.
So with that admonition we would ask the bailiff
to return the jury to the jury room and court will be in recess
(The jury left the courtroom at 5:43 p.m.)
(Recess).
(Jury returned to the courtroom at 7:58 p.m.)
THE COURT:

The rec6rd may show that all

members of the jury are present.
Members of the jury have you met and selected one
of your group as foreman?
JUROR WORTHEN:
THE COURT:

Yes, we have.

Mr. Wor|:hen, are you the foreman

of the jury?
JUROR WORTHEN:
THE COURT:

Yesi

Have you deliberated and reached

a decision?
JUROR WORTHEN: Yes|.
THE COURT:

Would you hand the verdicts to

the court bailiff.
I would ask the clerk of! the court to read the
verdict.

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR

I

385 BRAHMA DRIVE 84107 RES 266-0320
COURTS BLDG 240 E 4 S (801) 535-7(572
231 JUDGE BUILDING OFF 533-080J0
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
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ADDENDUM B

$alt Lake County, Utah

DEBRA K. LOY
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

SEP 291986
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
-V-

Cas^ No. CR86-1212

RANDELL KOTZ,
Defendant.

Comes now the defendant, RANDELL KOTZ, by and through
counsel of record, DEBRA K. LOY, and moves the Court to grant the
defendant a new trial on the grounds the Court erroneously
instructed the jury concerning its inability to reach a verdict
after reasonable deliberation and indication by the foreman that the
jury was divided and deadlocked.
The defendant specifically alleges it was error for the
Court to instruct the jury orally without (submitting the proposed
instruction to counsel as required by Rule 19, Utah Rules of
Criminal Proceddure.

The defendant further alleges error in the

substance of the instruction given as being likely to cause a juror
to abandon his convictions in order to pldase the Court, and that
such instruction is a denial of defendant's right to trial by jury.

In the only Utah case found on this point/State v.
Zimmermany IP.2d 962 (Utah 1931), the Court refused a new trial on
similar circumstances, on the grounds said remarks of the Court were
not excepted to.

The instant case differs however in that defense

counsel, while not excepting after the remark or instruction of the
Court, requested no further instruction be given, requested the
opportunity to review the instruction to be given by the Court and
requested the opportunity to prepare a written instruction before
the jury was addressed.

All of said requests were denied.

Further,

said remarks in the instant case were sufficiently lengthy and
indicated great impatience with the jurys1 deadlock and was
therefore manifest error which compelled the jury to return a
verdict.

(See State v. Zimmerman, dissenting opinion by Justice

Straup.)
The error was substantial in the instant case based on the
lack of overwhelming evidence of guilt, invaded the province of the
jury and impacted the verdict.
All necessary evidence for consideration of this motion by
the trial Court exists in the record of the proceedings at the point
the Court orally instructed the jury.
Defendant has attached hereto the only Utah authority to be
found on this issue and a summary of the law of other
jurisdictions.
DATED this j^f\

day of September, 1986.

iMf^JL
DEBRA K.

LOY

Attorney for Defendant

\.;N^

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the above
entitled matter will come on regularly for bearing on the 3rd day of
October, 1986, at the hour of 2:30 p.m. before the Honorable Homer
F. Wilkinson, Third District Court Judge,

please govern yourselves

accordingly.
DATED this

day of September, 1986.

is\.a^
DEBRA K. LOY
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's
Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah this
September, 1986.

^a?u^~
)L

^t9m

day of

ADDENDUM C

Ariz.

STATE v. THOMAS

197

v ^ Cite as 342 P.2d 197

[3] Plaintiff contends that because "the ^ the learned trial court was therefore corabove statute does not specifically enum- rect in dismissing the cpmplaint
erate—as one of the grounds of appeal—
Judgment affirmed.
the Board's refusal to give her a license
for failing to make a passing grade, thereP H E L P S , C. J., andjSTRUCKMEYER,
by she has the right to base her review in J O H N S O N and B E R N S T E I N , J J , conthe superior court upon the Administrative cur.
Review Act. The argument is advanced
that the purpose of the last named Act
"is to grant the right of appeal from
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM/
5YSTEM>
so * W administrative orders and decisions,
and must be deemed to complement
those powers or acts previously enacted which provide for judicial rem Ariz. 161
view but do not provide for a definite
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
procedure." (Emphasis supplied.)
v. |
This position appears to us to be wholly
untenable as surely the legislature did not
intend to permit a disgruntled applicant to
jump from the one Act to the other.
Moreover, it is a well recognized rule of
statutory construction that where special
provisions of a statute deal with the same
subject as a general statute, the special
provision prevails. Moeur v. Chiricahua
Ranches Co., 48 Ariz. 226, 241, 61 P.2d
163.
It should be noted that the Administrative Review Act expressly limits the right
of review thereunder to situations where
no other relief is available. We quote:
"Sec. 12-902.

No. 1112.
Supreme Court of Arizona,
July 20, J1959.

Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court of Cochise County, J. Mercer
Johnson, J., of manslaughter, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, J. Smith
Gibbons, Superior Court Judge, held that
use of Voeckell instruction will no longer
be tolerated and approved by Supreme
Court.
Reversed and remanded with direction.

Scope of article

"A. This article applies to and governs every action to review judicially
a final decision of an administrative
agency except the state department of
public welfare, or where the act creating or conferring power on an agency
or a separate act provides for judicial
rcz'iczv of the agency decisions and
prescribes a definite procedure for the
review"
(Emphasis supplied.)
[4,5] The Beauty Culture Act, giving it
reasonable and logical construction, we
believe provided a remedy of review for
"*c plaintiff under the particular circumstances herein shown, as well as prescribing
* definite procedure to follow. We hold
a

Albert D. THOMAS, Appellant

1. Criminal Law G=>844(l)

There was no merit to state's conteni

tion that defendant in homicide prosecution
had waived and made no valid objection to
Voeckell instruction.
2. Criminal Law <§=>79ft(l), 863(2), 865(1)
Voeckell instruction, in light of surrounding circumstances under which it is
given, should not overemphasize importance of agreement, suggest that any juror
surrender his independent judgment, or say
or do anything from which jury could possibly infer that court is indicating anxiety
for or demanding some verdict, or subjecting jury to hardships of long deliberations.
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. 3. Criminal Law <§=>865(l), M74(l)
Under circumstances under which it
was given, Voeckell instruction could have
implied to jury the court's anxiety for it to
arrive at some verdict and therefore giving
of such instruction would require reversal
of manslaughter conviction.
4. Criminal Law <§=>798(l), 863(2), 865(1)
When and wherever use of Voeckell
instruction is called into question, it must
stand or fall upon facts and circumstances
of particular case.
5. Criminal Law @»798(l), 863(2), 865(1)
Use of Voeckell instruction will no
longer be tolerated and approved by Supreme Court.

Flynn & Allen, Phoenix, for appellant.
Robert Morrison, Atty. Gen., James H.
Green, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Lloyd
C. Helm, County Atty., John G. Pidgeon,
Deputy County Atty., Bisbee, for appellee.
J. SMITH GIBBONS, Superior Court
Judge.
Albert D. Thomas, appellant, and his
wife, Ellora Thomas, were jointly charged
with murder in the first degree of one
Frank Crane. The wife was acquitted
and appellant, hereinafter called defendant, was convicted of manslaughter and
sentence imposed. We consider that the
only serious question to be determined is
whether or not the learned trial court erred
in giving what is herein called the Voeckell
instruction, under the facts and circumstances shown by the record in this case.
It is undisputed that Frank Crane was
shot and killed in a gun battle between decedent and his son, John Crane, on the one
hand, and the defendant and his wife on the
other, during which many shots were fired
by both sides. There is a direct conflict
on virtually every material fact in issue.
The state asserts the first shots came from
the Thomas truck and the defendant insists the Cranes started the shooting and he
killed Frank Crane in self-defense. There
is evidence supporting each of these claims

from which reasonable persons f
honestly disagree as to who was th
gressor.
After six days of trial the case was
mitted to the jury at 3:20 p. m. on Ma
1956. At 12:00 o'clock midnight the'J
called the jury into open court and
following proceedings were had: •'•»*•'
"The Court: Let the record sho
the presence of the defendants and
attorneys and the jury, of cours
Members of the jury, I asked the bafli
to bring you down. Who is the fo?
• man, incidentally?
•:
:

"The Foreman: I am, your honor
'The Court: "Do you think you ar
going to be able to arrive at a verdi
in this matter? A. We were wo
dering if we could—if it was pe
missible for the jury and you to met
"Q. No. A. Well, we didn't kno^
We were doubtful.
*-."*
"Q. No. That would be very im
proper to do that. A. And if ri
speaking for the jury, we feel th
there is not enough evidence—
"Q. I don't want you to tell me.
What I want to know is whether you
think it is possible to arrive at a ver
diet. A. I don't.
r
"Q. Let me ask the rest of the juK
ors, is it the opinion of all of you that
you cannot arrive at a verdict? (Sev-;
cral Jurors) A. Yes.
k
"Q. That seems to be the general
concensus of opinion ? Do you believe
if I sent you back for further deliberation that you might possibly arrive at a
verdict? A. Providing we had one
law of the court read to us again. .£
"Q. Well, do you think it would
help if the instructions were re-read to
you? A. I do.
"Q. Do the rest of the jurors th.ii r
it would help ? (A Juror) A. No sir.
"Q. You don't think it would make:
any difference? A. No sir.
,r"Q. When I gave my instructions
you probably noticed I had the court

rift
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reporter record them on the machine,
-nd it wouldn't be too much difficulty
to have them played back to you.- If
. you think it would be of some assistance I would be glad to do that. A.
\Ve could try it.
"(Foreman) I think it would be
worth a trial."
"(Court) All right, Mr. NefT, can
you set up your machine and do that."
"(The court's instructions were
played back.)
"(Court) All right, members of the
jury* * a m £> o m £ t 0 &* ve v o u * u r t n e r
instructions in this case. You are further instructed, members of the jury,
that although the verdict to which each
juror agrees must, of course, be his own
verdict and the result of his own convictions and not a mere acquiescence
in the conclusion of his fellows, yet in
order to bring twelve minds to a unanimous result you must examine the question submitted to you with candor and
with proper regard and deference to
the opinions of each other.
"There is no reason to suppose that
this case will ever be submitted to
twelve more intelligent, more impartial or more competent jurors to decide it, or that more or clearer evidence will be produced on one side or
the other. With this in view it is
your duty to decide this case if you
can without yielding your conscientious
convictions. In conferring together
you ought to pay proper attention to
each other's opinion and listen with a
disposition to be convinced by other's
arguments, and on the other hand if
a larger number of your panel are for
conviction, a dissenting juror should
consider whether a doubt in his own
mind is a reasonable one which makes
no impression on the minds of so many
jurors equally honest, equally intelligent with himself who have heard the
same evidence, with the same oath;
and if on the other hand the majority
ar
e for the defendant, the minority

should ask themselves whether they
may not and ought to reasonably doubt '
seriously the correctness of a judgment which is not concurred in by most
of those with whom tney are associated
and distrust the weigfht and sufficiency
of that evidence wh|ch fails to carry
conviction to the min^ds of their fellow
jurors."
At 12:55 a, m. the jury retired for further deliberations; at 2:30 a. m. the jurors
requested information regarding the verdicts submitted, and were informed by the
court that they should separately decide the
guilt or innocence of each defendant.
It is reasonable to assume from this record that at least a partj of the time between
12:55 a. m., when deliberations were resumed upon giving the Voeckell instruction, and 2:30 a. m., when they requested
and received information as to the permissible forms of veifdicts, was consumed
in a discussion of thiis particular problem.
The announced inability to arrive at a verdict was thereupon resolved and agreement
reached in a comparatively short time after
such instruction was given.
[1] The defendant assigns as error the
giving of this instruction at the time and
under the circumstances of the case, considering the gravity of the charge, the
nature of the defense, the complexity of
the issues, the length! of time the jury had
been deliberating, and failure of the court
to advise that they! could retire for the
night and resume deliberations the following day. The state oifi the other hand points
out that the instruction is proper and has
been approved by t|iis court in State r.
Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 210 P.2d 972; State
v. Lubetkin, 78 Ariz; 91, 271 P.2d 520, and
should be upheld. {The state's contention
that the defendant I waived and made no
valid objection thereto is without merit in
this case.
Subsequent to the filing of this appeal
we again considered and approved in principle this controversial instruction in State
v. Craft, 85 Ariz. 143, 333 P.2d 728. Justice Windes, speaking in a unanimous opin-
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ion, specially concurred in by Justice Udall
and Justice Struckmeyer, said, 333 P.2d at
page 731:
"There may be circumstances that
would render this instruction invalid.
* * *.
« * * * j t - s n o t imperative that
the instruction be given at all; but
if it is to be given, the circumstances
should be carefully considered to the
end that there is no possibility the jury
could infer that the court is indicating
" anxiety for or demanding some verdict
or is imposing upon the jury the hardship of unreasonably lengthy deliberation."
[2] The pitfalls and dangers to be
avoided and the safeguards to be observed
in giving this instruction are clearly outlined by Justice Windes in the Craft case
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Udall
in the Voeckell case. This instruction,
in the light of the surrounding circumstances under which it is given, should not
overemphasize the importance of an agreement, suggest that any juror surrender his
independent judgment, or say or do anything from which the jury could possibly
infer that the court is indicating anxiety
for or demanding some verdict, or subjecting the jury to the hardships of long
deliberations.
The facts in the instant case show that
the jury, after a long day of trial and deliberation, were summoned to and interrogated in open court at midnight as to the
possibility of arriving at a verdict. Their
request to confer with the court, the foreman's statement "We feel that there is not
enough evidence * * * " (interrupted by
the Judge), statements they could not agree,
the court's suggestion to repeat the instructions and the playing of the record of the
instructions formerly given, did in our
opinion create an atmosphere of receptivity in the minds of the jury to any suggestion that would assist them in solving
the problem at hand. Without request or

notice the court gave the Voeckell.
tion and concluded with this J
"With this instruction
* * *}
may retire * * * for further 'de
tions."
(Emphasis supplied.)
[3] In the hour and thirty-five
that followed it would appear that
sue upon which information was re
at 2:30 a. m. was the main bone of
tion during that time. This matter
explained by the court only ten minu
required to reach their verdict,
convinced that the giving of the
instruction under the salient facts
could and did infer to the jury the
anxiety for it to arrive at some vef.
[4] Defendant's request that this
reconsider the Voeckell instructio
adopt the view advanced by Justice
in his dissenting opinion thereto „h
ceived consideration by us. W e . /
concede that a close reading anct
thereof, sentence by sentence, does n
veal any misstatement of the law.;J
now appears that the old adage refe~
by Justice Udall—"proof of the pudd
in the eating"—aptly applies. [69"
145, 210 P.2d 983.] This instructio
been before us four t'mss. Whe
-*
wherever its use is called into qu
it must stand or fall upon the facts an
cumstances of each particular case. ^
given, and we believe each use will gi
harassment and distress in the admi
tion of justice. No rule of thumb
cumscribe definite bounds of whea
where, or under what circumstanc"
should be given or refused.
[5] It now appears that its con"*
use will result in an endless chain 1
cisions, each link thereof tempered
forged with varying facts and circunr
.
• •flies and welded with ever-changinglj
sonalities of the appellate court. 'T^.
not in keeping with sound justice arf
preservation of human liberties and $
ty. W e are convinced that the evil
outweigh the benefits, and decree thai
use shall no longer be tolerated a~
proved by this court.
•<>
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Reversed and remanded with direction to
^jjt defendant a new trial.
PHELPS, C. J., and STRUCKMEYER,
pDALL and B E R N S T E I N , JJ., concur.
.VOTE: Justice J. MERCER J O H N S O N
L*n<r disqualified, Honorable J. S M I T H
GIBBONS, Superior Court Judge of
Apache County, was called to sit in his
Head, and participated in the determination
0f this cause.

V
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56 Ariz. 166
WHIIam Ralph GRIFFIN and John Joseph
Hour.han, Individually, and in the i\ght
and on the behalf of the electors and members of the Democratic Party of the State
of Arizona and in the rfght and on behalf
of the citizens and electors of the State
of Arizona, Appellants,
v.
A. P. (Jack) BUZARD, Appellee.
No. 6776.
Supreme Court of Arizona.
July 15, 1039.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 22, 1959.
Primary election contest. The Superior Court, Maricopa County, R. C. Stanford, Jr., J., rendered judgment dismissing
statement of primary election contest and
contestors appealed. The Supreme Court,
Udall, J., held that complaint alleging that
name of party, whose name was similar to
that of candidate for nomination; was
P'accd on ballot for purpose of deceiving
voters stated valid election contest.
Reversed with directions.

1. Elections <§»269
Election contests are purely statutory,
unknown to the common law, and are
"either actions at law nor suits in equity,
»l|t are special proceedings. A.R.S. § 161 't~\ i
_
i
«
.
1201
subd. A.
312 P 2d—13%

2. Elections <S»I54(9)
» In primary election contest initiated by
qualified electors against contestee with
purity of elections as its goal, candidate
who was defeated by alleged deception was
not an indispensable party and only necessary parties were named contestors and
party whose nomination was being contested. AJR.S. § 16-1201 et seq.
3. Elections C^ 154(2)
Even if there were defects in primary
nominations papers of defeated candidate
and he may have been an illegal candidate,
such fact would not avoid effect of statutory grounds of contesting successful candidate's nomination, nor defeat allegations
found in complaint that deception was
practiced and true |will of electorate could
not be ascertained. A.R.S. §§ 16-1201 to
16-1203.
4. Elections <©=>l54(9'/2)
In determining sufficiency of statement
of primary election contest on motion to
dismiss, allegations must be treated as true,
and whether they are susceptible of proof
at trial does not concern court, all intendments lie in favpr of pleading and not
against it, and mbtion to dismiss should
not be granted unless the relief sought
could not be sustained under any possible
theory. A.R.S. § 16-1201 et seq.
5. Elections €=154^10)
Primary election contest brought by
electors with purity of elections as its
goal was not a criminal action against
contestee and high degree of proof required to convict was not essential. A.R.S. §
16-1201 et seq.
6. Elections <©=»154(9«/2)
Complaint filed by electors, who contended that filing of candidate whose name
was the same as that of another candidate
except for middle initial was for purpose
of deceiving voters, stated valid primary
election contest uyider statute to effect that
electors may contest election if person
whose right is contested has committed any
offense against the elective franchise. A,
_ ~ ^ - - — ~ ^
R.S. § 16-1201 tfc sea.
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139 Cal Rptr 861
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Robert GAINER, Jr., Defendant
and Appellant.*
Cr. 19660.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Aug. 31, 1977.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 13,1977.
Defendant was convicted before the
Superior Court, Contra Costa County, Max
Wilcox, Jr., J., of murder, and he appealed.
The Supreme Court, Mosk, J., held that: (1)
trial court erred in submitting Allen charge
which encouraged jurors to consider numerical division or preponderance of opinion on
jury in forming or reexamining their views
on issues before them and which stated or
implied that if jury failed to agree the case
would necessarily be retried, and (2) Supreme Court's ruling would apply to instant
matter and all cases not final as of date of
court's decision.
Reversed.
Clark, J., dissented and filed opinion.
1. Criminal Law <s=> 1043(1)
Defense counsel, who had not been informed of trial court's intention to submit
supplemental Allen charge, was not required to interrupt trial court's charge at
every controversial phase in order to preserve his objection thereto; defense counsel's objection immediately after jury
retired preserved the issue for appellate
review.
2. Criminal Law <s=>857(l)
General rule that conclusions to be
reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and arguments in open court applies no less to juries than to judges.
3. Criminal Law <s=>857(l)
Both People and defendant have right
to individual judgment of each juror on
issue of guilt.
* Editor's Note The opinion of the Supreme
Court of California in In re Roger S published
in the advance sheets at this citation (566
P 2d 997) was withdrawn from the bound vol-

4. Criminal Law <*=>857(jl)
Minority jurors have no greater duty to
reexamine their views than do majority jurors.
5. Criminal Law <s=>863(2)
Courts should not hesitate to condemn
instruction which carrie$ a strong implication that jurors should Consider preponderance of votes in forming their views simply
because the charge subtly avoids an explicit
statement of that proposition.
6. Criminal Law e=>86^(2)
Encouragement given by Allen charge
to minority jurors' acquiescence in position
of majority jurors is manifestly incompatible with requirement! of independently
achieved jury unanimity.
7. Criminal Law $=>8$3(2)
Portion of Allen charge instructing
that dissenting jurors should consider
whether doubt in his or her mind is a reasonable one, which makes no impression on
minds of so many men or women equally
honest, equally intelligent with himself or
herself is objectionable as a judicial attempt
to inject illegitimate considerations into
jury debate and as an appeal to dissenting
jurors to abandon their own independent
judgment of case against defendant.
8. Criminal Law <s=>$65(l)
Portion of Allen charge admonishing
minority jurors to consider numerical division or preponderance of opinion on jury in
forming or reexamining their views on issues before them constitutes excessive pressure on dissenting jurors to acquiesce in a
verdict.
9. Criminal Law <s=» 1174(1)
Reversible error may be found in excessive pressure upon jury to reach a verdict,
whatever its nature, rather than no verdict
at all.
10. Criminal Law <fc=>863(2)
In prosecution for murder, trial court
erred in submitting Allen charge which encouraged jurors to consider numerical division or preponderance of opinion on jury in
ume at the request of the court and will be republished together with a modification of the
opinion at a later date
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forming or reexamining their views on the
issues before them.
11. Criminal Law <s=>867
; It is not true that a criminal case must
at some time be decided; possibility of
. hung jury is inevitable by-product of unanimous verdict requirement. •
12. Criminal Law to863(2)
'In prosecution for murder, trial court
erred in submitting Allen charge which
stated "the case must at some time be decided," in view of fact that instruction implying that hung jury would assuredly result in retrial misstated the law.
13. Criminal Law to863(2)
It is error for trial court to give an
instruction which either (1) encourages jurors to consider numerical division or preponderance of opinion on jury in forming or
reexamining their views on the issues before them, or (2) states or implies that if
jury fails to agree the case will necessarily
be retried.

17. Criminal Law to 1174(1)
.i. A conviction following Allen charge
which encourages jurors to consider numer-*
ical division or preponderance of opinion on''
jury in forming or reexamining their views'^
on issues before them is a miscarriage of
justice, and judgment of conviction must be
reversed.
18. Criminal Law
toll74(l)
***
A per se rule of reversal is not required
when only erroneous statement included in*
otherwise correct instructions is an implica-!
tion that if jury fails to agree the case will
necessarily be retried; in such cases a mis-'
carriage of justice will be avoided if review*-*
ing court makes further examination of all
circumstances under which charge was giv-"
en to determine whether it was reasonably
probable that result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in absence of the error.
. ^ ;;':

19. Criminal Law
to394.1(3)
*"
Where police officer improperly pro- | j
longed initial interview of defendant after
defendant had declined to waive Miranda
rights, but statements obtained from de14. Criminal Law to863(2)
fendant at that time were ambiguous, if not
* It is error for trial court to give in- completely benign, after such initial inter- ^
struction which refers to expense and incon- view defendant was permitted to meet with
venience of a retrial.
his parents in private, and after such meeting with his parents, defendant agreed to
15. Courts «=» 100(1)
show officer location of his revolver, de, Three considerations are relevant in de- fendant's consent to show officer his revolvtermining retroactivity of judicially de- er was not the result of exploitation of
clared rules of criminal procedure: purpose earlier interrogation so as to require exclu-'
to be served by new standards, extent of sion of defendant's weapon.
reliance by law enforcement authorities on
:tZ
20. Criminal Law «=>641.13(1)
old standards, and effect on administration
It is defendant's burden to show counof justice of a retroactive application of
sel's
incompetence.
new standards.
21. Criminal Law <s=>641.13(2)
* S16. Courts *=> 100(1)
Fact that defense counsel consented to
Rule announced by Supreme Court, police search for defendant's gun after t
that it is error for trial court to give in- meeting for approximately ten minutes
struction which encourages juror to con- with defendant did not support conclusion
sider numerical division or preponderance that defendant had been denied effective
of opinion on jury in forming or reexamin- assistance of counsel.
U.S.C.A.Const
ing their views on issues before them, or Amend. 6.
which states or implies that if jury fails to
agree the case will necessarily be retried
Craig Harris Collins, San Mateo, under
would apply to matter before Supreme
Court and to all cases not final as of date of appointment by the Supreme Court, for de-^
fendant and appellant.
- <
Supreme Court's decision.

\
k

:v s |

PEOPLE v. GAINER

Cai.

999

Cite M 566 PJd 997

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R.
Winkler, Chief Asst Atty. Gen., Edward P.
O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., William D. Stein,
Derald E. Granberg and David Schneller,
Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
MOSK, Justice.
In January 1975 defendant Robert Gainer, Jr., was tried in the Superior Court of
Contra Costa County on a charge of murder. (Pen. Code, § 187.)l The taking of
the testimony of more than 30 witnesses
consumed 12 days, concluding on the 28th
of January. On the 13th day of trial, at
10:30 in the morning, the case went to the
jury. Four times during that day the jury
interrupted their deliberations to ask that
various portions of the testimony be reread.
At 5:05 p.m. the jurors were sent home
without having reached a verdict.
On the morning of their second day of
deliberations the jurors again heard testimony read by request, and returned to the
jury room. At 4:45 p.m., when the jury
sent in a note asking for the rereading of
an instruction, the trial judge inquired as to
the numerical division of the panel. He
was informed that the last ballot stood nine
to three. The jurors, having failed to
agree, again were excused and permitted to
return home for the night.
On the morning of January 31, the 15th
day of trial and the 3d day of deliberations,
the jury heard one witness* testimony read
and continued deliberating. At 11 a.m. the
jurors were reassembled in the courtroom
where the foreman indicated they were
having difficulty reaching a verdict. The
judge again inquired as to their numerical
count, and the foreman replied, "Eleven to
one." At this point the judge read the
following instruction:

mere' acquiescence in the conclusion of his
or her fellows, yet in oifder to bring twelve
minds to a unanimous j-esult, you must examine the questions submitted to you with
candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other. You
should consider that the case must at some
time be decided, that you are selected in the
same manner and from the same source
from which any future jury must be selected, and there is no reason to suppose the
case will ever be submitted to twelve men
or women more intelligent, more impartial
or more competent to decide it, or that
more or clearer evidence will be produced
on the one side or the other. And, with this
view, it is your duty to decide the case, if
you can conscientiously do so.
"In order to make a decision more practicable, the law imposes the burden of proof
on one party or the other in all cases. In
the present case, the burden of proof is on
the People of the State of California to
establish every part of it beyond a reasonable doubt. And, if in any part of it you are
left in doubt, the defendant is entitled to
the benefit of the doubt and must be acquitted. But in conferring together, you
ought to pay proper respect to each other's
opinions and listen with a disposition to be
convinced to each other's arguments.
"And, on the otljer hand, if much the
larger of your panel are for a conviction, a
dissenting juror should consider whether a
doubt in his or her own mind is a reasonable
one, which makes no impression upon the
minds of so many men or women equally
honest, equally intelligent with himself or
herself, and [who] have heard the same
evidence with the same attention and with
an equal desire to arrive at the truth and
under the sanction of the same oath.

"Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:
"In a large proportion of cases and perhaps strictly speaking, in all cases, absolute
certainty cannot be attained or expected.
Although the verdict to which a juror
agrees must, of course, be his own verdict,
the result of his own convictions and not a

"And, on the other hand, if a majority are
for acquittal, the minority ought seriously
to ask themselves whether they may not
reasonably and ought not to doubt the correctness of a judgment, which is not concurred in by most of those with whom they
are associated, and distrust the weight or
sufficiency of that evidence which fails to

1. Defendant was also charged with being armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the

offense and with using afirearmin committing
the crime. (Pen. Code, §§ 12022, 12022.5.)
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carry conviction to the minds of their fellows.
. "That is given to you as a suggestion of
the theory and rationale behind jurors coming to a decision one way or the other.
"So, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury,
I'm going to ask you—after lunch—to
retire and continue with your deliberations
and see if it is at all possible to resolve the
matter.
"I understand that, of course, on occasions it is impossible to do so, but—based
upon the instruction I have just given to
you—I would appreciate that after lunch—
if you would go back and resume your
deliberations and see if you can arrive at a
verdict and that the deadlock can be broken."
. After lunch—a total of two hours and 55
minutes after resuming deliberations—the
jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder
in the second degree, with a finding that
defendant was armed with a deadly weapon
at the time of the offense and that he used
a firearm in committing the offense.
[1] On appeal from the judgment entered on this verdict, we consider for the
first time the permissibility of the final
instruction given to the jury shortly before
they returned a verdict on the third day of
deliberations.2 The instruction, which is of
a type commonly referred to either as the
"Allen charge" or the "dynamite charge,"
has had a controversial history since it was
cursorily approved by the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154,
41 L.Ed. 528. Because it instructs the jury
to consider extraneous and improper factors, inaccurately states the law, carries a

w.
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2. Defense counsel objected to the charge immediately after the jury retired Nevertheless, the
People contend that defendant "acquiesced" in
the decision to give the instruction for a deliberate tactical purpose, and hence that any objection was waived. (See People v Graham
(1969) 71 Cal 2d 303, 319, 78 Cal Rptr 217, 455
P.2d 153 ) The People point to no expressions
of counsel in the record which substantiate
their speculation that Gainer's attorney "surmised" that the jury stood 11 to 1 for acquittal
and therefore acceded to the instruction in
question To compensate for this evidentiary
void, the People invite us to infer a deliberate
acquiescence from defendant's failure to object
to the instruction in advance or in mid-passage

potentially coercive impact, and burdens
rather than facilitates the administration of *
justice, we conclude that further use of the^l
charge should be prohibited in California, f
-In reviewing defendants contention that"
the charge was erroneous as a matter of
law, it will be helpful to trace the history of'
the instruction from its relatively innocuous"
origin, through its heyday as a popular^
technique for extracting verdicts from
deadlocked juries, and into its twilight
years as a prolific generator of appellate
controversy. In the process we shall identify and assess those aspects of the charge
which are the central objects of defendant's
attack.
;;p
Genesis of the uAllen Charge" - . v S ^ j k
The Allen case from which the instruc- j4
tion takes its name is a most unprepossess- -;
ing leading authority Alexander Allen JSp*5
was a 14-year-old boy who had been con- ~* '*"
victed of murder. His conviction was reversed by the United States Supreme Court jp«
because of a faulty jury instruction (Allen
v. United States (1893) 150 U.S. 551, 14
S.Ct. 196, 37 L.Ed. 1179), and after a retrialLj
his second conviction was reversed by the
Supreme Court because of another errone-*
ous instruction (Allen v. United States
(1895) 157 U.S. 675, 15 S.Ct. 720, 39 LEA
854). After a third conviction his case went^
again to the Supreme Court. (Allen v.
United States (1896) 164 US 492, 17 S.Ct J
154, 41 LEd. 528.) No counsel appeared for
Allen, and the court declared itself "somewhat embarrassed
.
by the absence of a brief on the part of the plaintiff
in error . .
." (Id. at p. 494, 17 S.Ct ^
at p. 154.) Nevertheless, the court did con-'
sider 18 assignments of error in the record, ^
Again, however, the record fails to contradict
defense counsel's statement, after the charge
was read, that "I was not even asked nor was i t j
ever indicated to me that the instruction was
ever to be given in this case " Clearly defend- ^
ants cannot be required to anticipate supplemental instructions a judge might give, upon j
pain of inviting error Nor was defense counsel required to interrupt the judge's charge at ^
every controversial phrase, thereby courting
the animosity of the jury and implying that the
charge hurt his client's case Indeed common
courtesy, and respect for the dignity of judicial ^
proceedings, caution against interruption of t J
judge who is advising the jury
-*
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the last 2 of which concerned the instruc- Allen case." (United States v. Bailey (5th
tion now known as the "Allen charge." Cir. 1972) 468 F,2d 652, 666.)
The court noted that the instruction was
Nevertheless, the Allen charge won rela"taken literally from a charge in a criminal tively quick adoption in some 10 states.
case which was approved of by the Supreme (See Note, An Argument for the AbandonCourt of Massachusetts in Commonwealth ment of the Allen Charge in California
v. Tuey, 8 Cush. 1 . . . ." (Id. at p. (1975) 15 Santa Clara Law. 939, fn. 3; An501, 17 S.Ct. at p. 157.)3
not., 100 A.L.R.2d 177-217.) California was
After paraphrasing the instruction, the not among the early enthusiasts. Undoubtcourt reasoned that "While, undoubtedly, edly the popularity of the instruction
the verdict of the jury should represent the stemmed from its perceived efficiency as a
opinion of each individual juror, it by no means of "blasting" a verdict out of a deadmeans follows that opinions may not be locked jury in a manner which had the
changed by conference in the jury-room. imprimatur of the highest court in the
4
The very object of the jury system is to land. At the same time, trial judges were
secure unanimity by a comparison of views, not averse to adding their own embellishand by arguments among the jurors them- ments to the approved text, frequently in
selves. It certainly cannot be the law that an apparent attempt to increase the intensieach juror should not listen with deference ty of the "blast." The practice arose of
to the arguments and with a distrust of his adding an observation, not included in the
own judgment, if he finds a large majority instruction originally approved in Allen, to
of the jury taking a different view of the the effect that "the case must at some time
case from what he does himself. It cannot be decided" (see, e. g., People v. Ozene
be that each juror should go to the jury- (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 905, 911, 104 Cal.Rptr.
room with a blind determination that the 170; United States v. Brown (7th Cir. 1969)
verdict shall represent his opinion of the 411 F.2d 930, 933; Huffman v. United
case at that moment; or, that he should States (5th Cir. 1962) 297 F.2d 754, 759
close his ears to the arguments of men who (cone, and dis. opn. of Brown, J.)) or that
are equally honest and intelligent as him- the jury had been "selected in the same
self. There was no error in these instruc- manner and from the same source from
tions." (Id. at pp. 501-502, 17 S.Ct. at p. which any future jury must be selected, and
there is no reason to suppose the case will
157.)
Given this procedural history, and the ever be submitted to twelve men or women
Allen court's brief treatment of the elabo- more intelligent, more impartial or more
." (Ozene,
rately crafted collection of nuances and in- competent to decide it .
supra,
at
p.
911
of
27
Cal.App.3d,
at p 174
timations composing the challenged instruction, "there is little wonder that many of 104 Cal.Rptr.; see also Mathes, Jury
doubt whether the case would not be decid- Instructions and Forms for Federal Crimied differently today. [Citation.] But that nal Cases (1969) 27 F.R.D. 39, Inst No. 8.19
it should have become the foundationstone at pp. 102-104)
of all modern law regarding deadlocked juThus it is somewhat imprecise to refer to
ries is perhaps the greatest anomaly of the a single Allen charge. Decades of judicial
3. The court summarized the charge as being,
"in substance, that in a large proportion of
cases absolute certainty could not be expected,
that although the verdict must be the verdict of
each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they
should examine the question submitted with
candor and with a proper regard and deference
to the opinions of each other, that it was their
duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so, that they should listen, with a
disposition to be convinced, to each other's
arguments, that, if much the larger number
were for conviction, a dissenting juror should

consider whether his doubt was a reasonable
one which made no impression upon the minds
of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself If, upon the other hand, the
majority was for acquittal, the minority ought
to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment
which was not concurred In by the majority "
(Ibid)
4. For a survey of the more draconian measures
which have been thought useful in procunng
verdicts, see the discussion in United States v
Bailey (5th Cir 1972) supra, 468 F2d 652, 665
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improvisation have produced a variety of
permutations and amplifications of the
original wording, some remarkably elaborate. (See, e. g., Tomoya Kawakita v. United States (9th Cir. 1951) 190 F.2d 506, 524525, fn. 17; Mathes, op. cit. supra, 27 F.R.D.
39, 102.) Nevertheless, it is possible to isolate the two elements frequently found in
such instruction—and found in the charge
given in this case—which raise the gravest
doubts as to their propriety.
The first and most questionable feature is
the discriminatory admonition directed to
minority jurors to rethink their position in
light of the majority's views. In the Allen
opinion this concept is expressed in the following passage: "if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror
should consider whether his doubt was a
reasonable one which made no impression
upon the minds of so many men, equally
honest, equally intelligent with himself. If,
upon the other hand, the majority was for
acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably
doubt the correctness of a judgment which
was not concurred in by the majority."
(164 U.S. at p. 501, 17 S.Ct. at p. 157.) The
same language, with some elaboration and
deference to female jurors, was used by the
trial judge in the case at bar. A second
controversial element in Allen -type instructions, not approved in Allen itself, is the
direction given by the court below that
"You should consider that the case must at
some time be decided."
. Neither of the foregoing phrases received
judicial approval in California until 1958.
In that year, the Court of Appeal considered a case in which the trial judge, after
inadvertently learning that the jury stood
11 to 1 for conviction, delivered a conven-

tionally embellished version of the Allen
instruction. (People v. Baumgartner (1958)
166 Cal.App.2d 103, 332 P.2d 366.) The
appellate court reversed the conviction on
the ground that under the circumstances
the charge was coercive of the holdout juror. Nevertheless, without citing Allen or
any other authority, the court also declared
in dictum that had the trial judge "not been
informed to the knowledge of all as to the
fact that the jury stood 11 to 1 for conviction" the charge would have been proper,
since it had been "worked out long ago as
to form and ha[d] been frequently used."
Id. at p. 108, 332 P.2d at p. 370.) On the
basis of Baumgartner, Courts of Appeal
also approved Allen -type charges in People
v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 896, 83
CaLRptr. 260; People v. Gibson (1972) 23
CaLApp.3d 917, 921,101 CaLRptr. 620; People v. Guillen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 976, 985,
113 CaLRptr. 43, and People v. Terry (1974)
38 Cal.App.3d 432, 448, 113 CaLRptr. 233,
footnote 2. Allen itself is first cited in
support of the charge which bears its name
in People v. Ozene (1972) supra, 27 Cal.
App.3d 905, 910-914, 104 CaLRptr. 170.
However, no supplemental jury instruction
containing either the admonition to minority jurors or the statement that "the case
must at some time be decided" has ever
been approved in a holding of this court.
In evaluating the charge we also consider
its treatment in recent decisions of other
jurisdictions. There we find that Allen-type
instructions have been subjected to a withering barrage of attacks, largely on the
grounds they are coercive or inaccurate.5
Although no opinion of the United States
Supreme Court has addressed a challenge to
this charge since the original Allen case,1 3
federal circuits7 and at least 22 states 8

5. The Allen charge has also been the subject of
nam); Kawakita v. United States (1952) 343
intense critical commentary (See, e. g., Note,
U.S. 717, 744, 72 S.Ct. 950. 96 L.Ed. 1249;
An Argument for the Abandonment of the AlJohnson v. Louisiana (1972) 406 U.S. 356, 362,
len Charge m California (1975) 15 Santa Clara
92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152.
Law. 939, Note, The Allen Charge Recurring 7. These are the Third, Seventh, and District of
Problems and Recent Developments (1972) 47
Columbia Circuits. (See United States v. FiorN.Y.U.L.Rev 296, Note, Due Process, Judicial
avanti (3d Cir. 1969) 412 F.2d 407, cert. den.
Economy and the Hung Jury- A Reexamination
sub nom. Panaccione v. United States (1969)
of the Allen Charge (1967) 53 Va.lLRev. 123;
396 U.S. 837, 90 S.Ct. 97, 24 L.Ed.2d 88; United
Note, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite. A CritStates v. Brown (7th Cir. 1969) 411 F2d 930;
1
ical Look at the *Allen' Charge (1964) 31
United States v Thomas (1971) 146 U S.App
U.Chi.L.Rev 386)
D.C. 101. 449 F.2d 1177.)
6. But see Lias et al v United States (1931) 284 8. State court cases which have disapproved
Allen -type instructions, in whole or in part.
U.S. 584. 52 S Ct. 128, 76 LEd. 505 (per cu-
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have disapproved the instruction. The
American Bar Association has recommended abandonment of the charge.9
Moreover, many decisions which tolerate
continued use of the charge have done so
grudgingly under compulsion of stare decisis (e. g., 17. S. v. Bailey (5th Cir. 1972)
supra, 468 F.2d 652, 669, affd. (1973) 480
F.2d 518), or have sought to place curbs on
its use. These restrictions often take the
form of limiting the charge to the original
language approved in Allen (see, e. g., United States v. Flannery (1st Cir. 1971) 451
F.2d 880, 883; United States v. Kenner (2d
Cir. 1965) 354 F.2d 780, 782-784; United
States v. Rogers (4th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d
433), or requiring "balancing" instructions
(see, e. g., Flannery, supra, at p. 883; Note
On Instructing Deadlocked Juries (1968) 78
Yale L.J. 100, 106, fn. 26, and cases cited).
In short, the indisputable modern trend is
to abandon Allen (U S. v. Bailey (5th Cir.
1972) supra, 468 F2d 652, 668), and an
examination of the impact of each of the
crucial elements which may be found in
include: Fields v. State (Alaska 1971) 487 P.2d
831; State v. Thomas (1959) 86 Ariz. 161, 342
P.2d 197; Taylor v. People (1971) 176 Colo.
316, 490 P.2d 292; Bryan v. State (Fla.App.
1973) 280 So.2d 25; State v. Brown (1971) 94
Idaho 352, 487 P.2d 946; People v. Mills (1971)
131 IU.App.2d 693, 268 N.E.2d 571; State v.
Nicholson (La. 1975) 315 So.2d 639; State v.
White (Me.1972) 285 A.2d 832; People v. Sullivan (1974) 392 Mich. 324, 220 N.W.2d 441;
State v. Martin (1973) 297 Minn. 359, 211
N.W.2d 765; State v. Randall (1960) 137 Mont.
534, 353 P.2d 1054; State v. Garza (1970) 185
Neb. 445, 176 N.W.2d 664; Azbill v. State
(1972) 88 Nev. 240, 495 P.2d 1064; State v.
Blake (1973), 113 N.H. 115. 305 A.2d 300; State
v. Minns (1969) 80 N.M. 269, 454 P.2d 355;
State v. Champagne (N.D.1972) 198 N.W.2d
218; State v. Marsh (1971) 260 Or. 416, 490
P.2d 491, cert. den. sub nom. O'Dell v. Oregon
(1972) 406 U.S. 974, 92 S.Ct. 2420, 32 L.Ed.2d
674; Commonwealth v. Spencer (1971) 442 Pa.
328, 275 A.2d 299; State v. Patriarca (1973)
112 R.I. 14, 308 A.2d 300; Kersey v. State
(Tenn.1975) 525 S.W.2d 139; Kelley v. State
(1971) 51 Wis.2d 641, 187 N.WJ2d 810; Elmer
v. State (Wyo.1969) 463 P.2d 14.
9. In so recommending, the American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated the following standard:
"5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked
jury.
"(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation,
the court may give an instruction which informs the jury:

Allen -type charges demonstrates the persuasive justification for that sentiment.
The Admonition to Minority Jurors
[2,3] One of the basic ingredients in our
traditional concept of a fair trial is a circumscription on that which the trier of fact
may consider in reaching a verdict. " 'The
theory of our system is tfhat the conclusions
to be reached in a case will be induced only
by evidence and arguments in open court
. . . . ' " (Sheppardl v. Maxwell (1966)
384 U.S. 333, 351, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1516, 16
L.Ed.2d 600, quoting frcfm Patterson v. Colorado (1907) 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556,
51 L.Ed. 879.) This ru e applies no less to
juries than to judges, and the decisions of
both this court and the United States Supreme Court reflect tne importance of restricting the foundation for the jury's decision to the evidence and arguments presented at trial. (See, e. g., ISheppard v. Maxwell
(1966) supra, 384 U.S 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507;
Irvin v. Dowd (1961) 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct.
1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751; Turner v. Louisiana
"(i) that in order to return a verdict, each
juror must agree thereto;
"(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with
one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment;
"(hi) that each juror must decide the case for
himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
"(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a
juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own
views and change his opinion if convinced it is
erroneous; and
"(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the
evidence solely because of the opinion of his
fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
"(b) If it appears to the court that the jury
has been unable to agree, the court may require
the jury to continue their deliberations and
may give or repeat an instruction as provided
in subsection (a). The court shall not require
or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for
an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
"(c) The jury may be discharged without
having agreed upon a verdict if it appears that
there is no reasonable probability of agreement." (ABA Project on Minimum Standards
for Criminal Justite, Stds. Relating to Trial by
Jury (Approved Draft 1968) std. 5.4.)
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(1965) 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d
424; and Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68
Cal.2d 375, 66 Cal.Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372.)
An equally significant principle relates to
the right of both the People and the defendant to the individual judgment of each juror on the issue of guilt. (People v. Dole
(1898) 122 Cal. 486, 495, 55 P. 581; People v.
Wong Loung (1911) 159 Cal. 520, 535,114 P.
829.)
[4,5] Yet in instructing that "a dissenting juror should consider whether a doubt
in his or her own mind is a reasonable one,
which makes no impression on the minds of
so many men or women equally honest,
equally intelligent with himself or herself,"
the trial judge pointedly directs the jurors
to include an extraneous factor in their
deliberations, i. e., the position of the majority of jurors at the moment. The one or
more "holdout" jurors are told that in
reaching their independent conclusions as to
whether or not a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt exists, they are to weigh
not only the arguments and evidence but
also their own status as dissenters—a consideration both rationally and legally irrelevant to the issue of guilt.10 They are thus
deflected from their proper role as triers of
fact, as effectively as if they had been
instructed to consider their doubts as to
guilt in light of their own prejudices or
desire to go home.
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, [6] Moreover, the extraneous majoritarian appeal contained in the Allen instruction interferes with the jury's task in a way
which threatens the defendant's right under
the California Constitution to have his guilt
or innocence determined by the unanimous
verdict of a jury of 12 persons. (Cal.Const.,
art. I, § 16; People v. Collins (1976) 17
Cal.3d 687, 692, 131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d
742; People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338,
350,121 Cal.Rptr. 509,535 P.2d 373.) "Una10. The instruction does not escape this condemnation because it may be interpreted as
requiring dissenters to merely "reexamine"
their views rather than to directly include majoritarian factors in the primary calculus of
guilt. At best this reading strains the language
of the charge. More significantly, minority jurors have no greater duty to "reexamine" their
views than do majority jurors. Finally, we
should not hesitate to condemn an instruction
which carries a strong implication that jurors

nimity obviously requires that each juror"
must vote for and acquiesce in the verdict
Acquiescence simply because the verdict has
been reached by the majority is not an3
independent judgment, and if permitted,
would undermine the right to a unanimous"
verdict." (People v. Superior Court (Thornas) (1967) 67 Cal.2d 929, 932, 64 Cal.Rptr.
327, 329, 434 P.2d 623.) The open encouragement given by the charge to such acquiescence is manifestly incompatible with the
requirement of independently achieved jury
unanimity.
[7] It follows that even if it were possible to demonstrate that Allen's admonition
to dissenters were without appreciable effect on a jury, it would nevertheless be '
objectionable as a judicial attempt to inject
illegitimate considerations into the jury de-"
bates and as an appeal to dissenting jurore
to abandon their own independent judgment of the case against the accused. *<;
Beyond doubt, however, the instruction"
has a devastating effect—otherwise it
would not have been considered efficacious
enough to defend through the years despite
its obvious flaws. The pragmatic force of
the charge has also encouraged both its
defenders and its opponents to phrase the
problem of its use in terms of whether or
not it "coerces" juries to reach verdicts.
(See, e.g., People v. Ozene (1972) supra, 27
Cal.App.3d 905, 910-914, 104 Cal.Rptr. 170;
Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries
(1968) 78 Yale L.J. 100, 105.)
However, if this "coercion" test is characterized as a quasi-factual inquiry into"
whether a juror did or did not surrender his (
true convictions, insuperable difficulties are J
encountered. Courts are generally unable
to recreate effectively the events, subjec-^
tive and objective, occurring during jurors'
deliberations in order to evaluate the actual ^
effects of an instruction.11 Nor is it clear^
should consider the preponderance of votes in
forming their views simply because the charge
subtly avoids an explicit statement of that .
proposition.
11. The limited admissibility of juror testimony
under People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal2d
342, 349, 78 Cal.Rptr. 196. 455 P.2d 132. and4
Evidence Code section 1150, clearly does not^
enable an effective inquiry of this type. Under
section 1150, subdivision (a), "any otherwise
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that even if judges were given such retrospective omniscience, they could agree on
the point at which a juror was "coerced"
into changing his vote. Given the difficulties ordinarily facing such a determination,
the duty of the courts to insure the fairness
of criminal trials requires a broader inquiry,
i.e., whether the instructions tend to impose
such pressure on jurors to reach a verdict
that we are uncertain of the accuracy and
integrity of the jury's stated conclusion.
This determination of whether the instructions "operate to displace the independent
judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency" (People v. Carter (1968), 68 Cal.2d 810, at p. 817,
69 Cal.Rptr. 297 at p. 302,442 P.2d 353 at p.
358) is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact
finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual volitional quality
of a particular jury verdict. Defendant's
claim that the Allen charge is inherently
coercive is thus more aptly phrased as a
contention that the instruction simply exerts "undue pressure upon the jury to reach
a verdict." (Id. at p. 817, 69 Cal.Rptr. at p.
302, 442 P.2d at p. 358; see also United
States v. Seawell (9th Cir. 1977) 550 F.2d
1159, 1163.)
[8,9] In addition to invoking impermissible considerations, the admonition to minority jurors given herein constitutes just
such excessive pressure on the dissenting
jurors to acquiesce in a verdict. The dissen-

ters, struggling to maintain their position in
a protracted debate in J the jury room, are
led into the courtroor^ and, before their
peers, specifically requested by the judge to
reconsider their position. No similar request is made of the majority.12 It matters
little that the judge (does not know the
identity of the particular dissenters; their
fellow jurors know, an<jl the danger immediately arises that "the Allen charge can compound the inevitable pressure to agree felt
by minority jurors." (People v. Smith
(1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 401, 406, 113 Cal.Rptr.
409, 413.) The charge " 'places the sanction
of the court behind the views of the majority, whatever they may be, and tempts the
minority juror to relinquish his position
simply because he ha£ been the subject of a
particular instruction.'" (U.S. v. Bailey,
supra, 468 F.2d at p. 662, quoting from
Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and
the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the
Allen Charge (1967) 53 Va.L.Rev. 123, 129130.) As we noted in Carter, reversible
error may be found in excessive pressure
upon the jury "to r^ach a verdict, whatever
its nature, rather than no verdict at all."
(68 Cal.2d at p. 817, 69 Cal.Rptr. at p. 302,
442 P.2d at p. 358.)»
[10] Neither is the overbearing character of the charge altered by the judge's
ignorance of whether the majority of the
jury favors conviction or acquittal. The
charge may distort the jury debate in a
direction favorable or unfavorable to the
defendant—but it distorts it nonetheless.14

admissible evidence may be received as to
12. Since recognition of the existence of a mastatements made, or conduct, conditions, or
jority or minority faction on the jury is irreleevents occurring, either within or without the
vant to the issue of guilt, such reference is
jury room, of such a character as is likely to
erroneous, even if contained in an arguably
have influenced the verdict improperly. No
noncoercive, "balanced" Allen charge which
evidence is admissible to show the effect of
explicitly admonishes the majority as well as
such statement, conduct, condition or event
the minority to reconsider their views.
upon a juror either in influencing him to assent
to or dissent frhm the verdict or concerning the 13. The People contend that Carter "implicitly
mental processes by which it was determined"
approved" the entire Allen charge. However,
(Italics added.) "Coercion," as used in this
language endorsing the admonition to minority
context, refers primarily to a process within
jurors to reconsider their views is conspicuousthe mind of the minority juror and responsive
ly absent from the Carter opinion.
to statements made by the judge in open court.
Thus, the evidence of "objective facts" admissi14. Of course, when an Allen charge provokes a
ble under section 1150 and Hutchinson (supra,
verdict of not guilty, the finality of that judgat p. 351, 78 Cal.Rptr. 196, 455 P.2d 132) will
ment precludes review of the instruction on
not resolve the issue. (See also ABA Project
appeal. Since appellate courts hear only cases
on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
involving conviction, it is impossible to estiStds. Relating to Trial by Jury (Approved Draft
mate the percentage of cases in which an Allen
1968) supra, commentary to std. 5.4(b) at p.
instruction is followed by a verdict of acquittal.
153.)
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Nor need we speculate that in the majority
of cases the giving of an Allen instruction
will aid the prosecution rather than the
defense: an even distribution of risk between prosecution and defense over a multitude of cases is not the measure of justice.
Our jury system aspires to produce fair and
accurate factual determinations in each
case. An improper instruction should not
be tolerated simply because statistically it
may help defendants as much as prosecutors. Whichever adversary it favors, in
urging minority jurors to reconsider their
votes the Allen charge places excessive and
illegitimate pressures on the deliberating
jury. For this reason the giving of the
charge is error.
"The Case Must at Some Time
be Decided"
The portion of the instruction beginning
with the phrase, "You should consider that
the case must at some time be decided,"
with its attendant implication that a mistrial will inevitably result in a retrial,
presents a somewhat different problem
from the admonition to minority jurors.
While the latter language was included in
the original instruction approved in Allen,
the former, as previously noted, was a judicial addition to the Allen text. On the
other hand, dictum in People v. Carter
(1968) supra, 68 Cal.2d 810, 815, 69 Cal.Rptr.
297, 301, 442 P.2d 353, 357, does suggest the
possibility of "reminding [the jury] that in
the event of a mistrial the case will have to
be retried." (See also People v. Miles (1904)
143 Cal. 636, 639, 77 P. 666; cf People v.
Burton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 328, 356, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 65, 359 ?2d 433; People v. Crowley
(1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 71, 74, 224 P.2d 748.)
[11,12] The language regarding the effect of a mistrial is vulnerable to a differ15. In the context in which the charge is delivered, "decided" clearly refers to a dispositive
determination of guilt by a trier of fact. Nor is
the misleading implication of the sentence dissipated when it is ambiguously phrased, as in
an alternate version, "the case must at some
time be disposed of."
16. A third common feature of Allen -type instructions is a reference to the expense and
inconvenience of a retrial. While such language was absent from the charge in this case,
it is equally irrelevant to the issue of defend-

ent, more esoteric objection: such state?
ments are legally inaccurate. It is simply
not true that a criminal case "must at some
time be decided."15 The possibility of a
hung jury is an inevitable by-product of our,
unanimous verdict requirement. Confront-'
ed with a mistrial, the People retain the1
authority to request dismissal of the action.
(Pen. Code, § 1385.) Moreover, this option
is frequently exercised, as the criminal bar
knows, when the prosecution concludes that
its inability to obtain a conviction stemmed
from deficiencies in its case. Thus the in-*
conclusive judgment of a hung jury may
well stand as the final word on the issue of
a defendant's guilt. Because an instruction4,
which implies that a hung jury will assured-^
ly result in a retrial misstates the law, the
court erred in giving that portion of the , ,
charge stating "the case must at some time* J
be decided." (Cf. People v. Morse (1964) 60
Cal.2d 631, 650, 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 ?J2d
33.)
[13,14] To summarize our conclusions"
thus far, both controversial features of the*
Allen-type charge discussed herein inject
extraneous and improper considerations"
into the jury's debates. We therefore hold
it is error for a trial court to give an
instruction which either (1) encourages jurors to consider the numerical division or
preponderance of opinion on the jury in
forming or reexamining their views on the
issues before them; or (2) states or implies
that if the jury fails to agree the case will
necessarily be retried.11 We adopt the foregoing as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. (Cf. People v. Rhodes (1974)
12 Cal.3d 180, 185, 115 Cal.Rptr. 235, 524
P.2d 363; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d
451, 461, 105 Cal.Rptr. 305, 503 P.2d 1313f
People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 442,
282 P.2d 905.) n Consequently we need not
ant's guilt or innocence, and hence similarly
impermissible.
17. This conclusion also has the beneficial effect
of removing a fertile source of criminal appeals. Were the giving of an Allen -type
charge potentially proper, the appellate courts
of this state would be required to sift the facts
and circumstances of each case in which the
charge was delivered to determine whether the ^
charge placed undue pressure on the jury to
agree. (See, e.g.. People v. Baumganner (1958)
supra, 166 Cal.App 2d 103, 107, 332 P 2d 366.)
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reach defendant's contention that the reading of the A/Zen-type charge violated his
due process rights to a fair trial.
Retroactivity
[15,16] In determining the appropriate
application of this holding, we begin with
the three relevant considerations prescribed
in previous cases: " '(a) the purpose to be
served by the new standards, (b) the extent
of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect
on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.'"
(People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641, 654,
117 Cal.Rptr. 9, 18, 527 P.2d 361, 370 quoting from Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S.
293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199.)l8
Undoubtedly our disapproval of Allen -type
charges is not directed at the prophylactic
prevention of police misconduct (see In re
Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 368, 377-379, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380; People v. Rollins
(1967) 65 Cal.2d 681, 685-691, 56 Cal.Rptr.
293, 423 P.2d 221; see also In re Harris
(1961) 56 Cal.2d 879, 880, 16 CaLRptr. 889,
366 P.2d 305 (cone. opn. of Traynor, J.));
rather it is aimed at judicial error which
significantly infects the fact-finding process
at trial. (See Stovall, supra, 388 U.S. at p.
298, 87- S.Ct. 1967.) Given this critical purpose, neither judicial reliance on previous
appellate endorsements of the charge in
this state nor any effects on the administration of justice require us to deny the benefit of this rule to cases now pending on
appeal. (Stovall, supra, at pp. 300-301, 87
S.Ct. 1967; People v. Charles (1967) 66
Cal.2d 330, 333-537, 57 Cal.Rptr. 745, 425
P.2d 545, and cases there cited.) The latter
consideration might be expected to weigh
heavily against reliance on today's ruling
for the purpose of reopening convictions
now final. (See Lopez, supra, 62 Cal.2d at
p. 381, 42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380; In re
Gaines (1965) 63 Cal.2d 234, 240, 45 Cal.
Eighteen years ago, consideration of the
amount of judicial energy spent on such inquiries prompted the Arizona Supreme Court to
abandon the charge. (State v. Thomas (1959)
86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197.) Other courts
which have banned Allen have also done so in
the name of appellate economy. (See United
States v. Brown, supra, 411 F.2d 930; United
States v. Fioravanti, supra, 412 F.2d 407; United States v. Thomas, supra, 146 U.S.App.D.C.
101, 449 F.2d 1177.)

Rptr! 865, 404 P.2d 473; Rollins, supra, Q5
Cal.2d at p. 685, 56 Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d
221.) However, because the record before
us provides little basis for assessing the
impact of such retroactive application, we
do not determine whether or not our holding should be cognizable on collateral attack. We decide only that the rule we here
announce shall apply to the instant matter
and to all cases not yet final as of the date
of this decision.
Prejudicial Effect
[17] Because we hold it is error to read
a charge containing either of the questionable elements discussed above, such instructions presumably will no longer be used in
this state. However, in order to resolve
appeals from convictions which come within
the limited rule of retroactivity announced
above—as well as to decide the present
case—it will be necessary to determine the
prejudicial effect of those errors. In considering this problem we distinguish the
two erroneous aspects of the charge delivered by the judge below.
As observed above, the ability of courts
to gauge the precise effect on a jury of
Allen -type instructions is limited, both by
the traditional secrecy of jury deliberations
and by the inherent difficulties of estimating the impact oi only one factor injected
into the subjective processes of each juror.
Many of these problems confront attempts
to determine the effect of any error, but
the difficulties are multiplied in the situation of the discriminatory admonition to
dissenters delivered as a supplementary instruction to a divided jury. For example,
when inadmissible evidence has been introduced in a criminal trial, the court reviewing a resulting conviction may conclude,
after examining all the evidence, that the
information erroneously admitted was "surplus" or otherwise nonprejudicial. (See, e.
g., People v. Cavanaugh (1955) 44 Cal.2d
18. These factors have been applied to determine the appropriate scope of judicially declared rules which are not necessarily constitutionally required. (See, e.g., In re Yurko (1974)
10 Cal.3d 857, ?65, 112 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d
561; HaJUday y\. United States (1969) 394 U.S.
831, 832, 89 S.Ct. 1498. 23 L.Ed.2d 16.)
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252, 268, 282 P.2d 53.) However, such evidentiary review is less apposite when, prior
to the infusion of error, the jury by hypothesis themselves canvassed the evidence and
arguments, and were unable to agree as to
their import. (See Note, op. cit. supra, 47
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 296, 308-309.) Moreover, the
attack on dissenters does more than simply
present another isolable factor for the
jury's consideration—it distorts the very
process by which all the evidence is
weighed. An appellate court therefore may
not assume that the verdict of the jury
represents an untainted evaluation of whatever evidence was before them.
' . The possibility of prejudicial effect, as
well as the difficulty of discovering such
effect, is magnified by the nature and timing of an admonition to minority jurors
when it is used, as is typically the case, to
undermine jury division. The instruction
skews the deliberative process in a particular direction—toward the result favored by
the majority. More significantly, this error
is introduced at a crucial stage when the
jury looks to the bench for advice on how to
solve their dilemma. At that point, all the
evidence and arguments already presented
to the jury—even if they may later seem to
a reviewing court to convincingly show the
defendant's guilt—have failed to produce a
verdict. Yet, with defendant's fate poised
in the balance, the trial judge then tips the
scales by use of an erroneous device. It is
hard to conceive of circumstances in which
error is more capable of producing prejudicial consequences.
; In sum, when the erroneous admonition
to minority jurors is given or repeated to a
criminal jury which have indicated that
they are divided, it is difficult if not impossible to ascertain if in fact prejudice occurred; yet it is very likely that it did. We
19. Similar considerations recently led the federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to
declare a per se rule of reversal in cases in
which a judge repeats an Allen charge "after a
jury has reported itself deadlocked and has not
itself requested a repetition of the instruction."
(United States v. Seawell (1977) supra, 550
. F.2d 1159, 1163.) The court conceded that 44A
per se rule, such as the one we have adopted
here, always poses the risk that it may sweep
within its embrace cases which do not warrant
its protection." (Fn. 8 at p. 1163.) However,
after noting that defendants would otherwise

conclude that a conviction following such a l
charge given in those circumstances is a
"miscarriage of justice" within the meaning*
of article VI, section 13, of the California 1
Constitution, and the judgment must be
reversed. (See also Code Civ.Proc., § 475; |
People v. Lyons (1956) 47 Cal.2d 311, 324, •
303 P.2d 329.)19 The rule requires reversal
in the instant case.
-H
£18] An erroneous instruction to the effect that "the case must at some time be
decided" presents some, but not all, of the
foregoing considerations. When the statement is part of a supplementary charge to a JSpj
divided jury, there is a significant danger
that the verdict will be influenced by
false belief that a mistrial will necessarily '
result in a retrial; on the other hand, the
statement does not threaten to distort the
process of jury decisionmaking to the same
degree as the admonition to dissenters. Ac- [
cordingly, a per se rule of reversal is not
required when only this erroneous stated
ment is included in otherwise correct instructions, even if given to a deadlocked
jury. In such cases a miscarriage of justice
will be avoided if the reviewing court
makes a further examination of all the circumstances under which the charge was
given to determine whether it was reasonably probable that a result more favorable
to the defendant would have been reached
in the absence of the error. (See People v.
Watson (1956) 46 CaL2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d
243.) In so doing, however, the court
should recognize that the more the erroneous statement appears to have been a significant influence exerted on a jury after a t
division of juror opinion had crystallized,
the less relevant is the court's own perception of the weight of the evidence presented
k
to the jury before the impasse.20
.^\ ;
"face insurmountable difficulties in attempting
to show prejudice," the majority concluded
that the " 'cost' of adopting a per se rule is
outweighed by the importance of defendant's
right to an impartial jury trial and the insur-;
mountable problems of proof and appellate re- .
view that a less definite rule would occasion.
(Ibid.)
;::v:
20. For example, when the statement is the central feature of instructions given to a deadlocked jury, it is more likely to have tainted
their subsequent verdict than when the panel
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error for the trial court to admit into eviAppropriate Instructions
dence
a revolver found at his apartment.
For the guidance of the trial bench, we
Second, he contends he was denied effective
note that none of the errors enumerated
assistance of counsel whep the attorney
herein is contained in CAUIC No. 17.40 (3d
with whom he consulted ^fter his arrest
ed. 1970), and we commend its continued
allowed the police to procijre the weapon.
use. The sample instruction endorsed by
Because the validity of any retrial of this
the American Bar Association also elimicase may depend on the correct resolution
nates the objectionable aspects of the
of these issues and they are properly before
charge given in this case, and advises the us, we decide them here. (Code Civ.Proc.,
jury of their proper role in a manner which §43.)
may assist them in their deliberations.21
Summary
[19] Defendant contends the gun was
The Allen charge, to the extent it still the "fruit" of an interrogation conducted in
survives, has been preserved because it is , violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384
deemed to be an effective device for pro- U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and
ducing verdicts from otherwise deadlocked was therefore inadmissible. (Wong Sun v.
juries. However, it achieves such efficacy United States (1963) 371 ^J.S. 471, 486, 83
as it may have through a subtle mixture of S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; People v. Superior
inaccuracy and impropriety, in a manner Court (Keithley) (1975) 13 Cal.3d 406, 410,
which can dramatically distort the fact- 118 Cal.Rptr. 617, 530 P.2d 585.) The interfinding function of the jury in a criminal view in question occurred immediately after
case.22 Ultimately, even the saving of judi- defendant presented himself at the police
cial resources, which has been the main station on the day of the crime. A tape of
justification for its continued existence, is the conversation revealed that he declined
outweighed by the burden the charge im- to waive his right to regain silent and
poses on the appellate courts. To borrow expressed a desire not to talk with police
the words uttered for a defendant who has officers at that time. The trial judge parlong since lost his appeal, in criminal trials tially granted defendants motion to supan Allen-type instruction "should never press statements made after the interrogatagain be read in a California courtroom." ing officer, Detective Kannisto, prolonged
(People v. Smith, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d 401, the interview, and the People do not contest
406, 113 Cal.Rptr. 409, 413.)
this ruling. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at
Remaining Issues
pp. 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Keithley, supra,
Two further issues are raised by defend- 13 Cal.3d at p. 410, 118 Cal.Rptr. 617, 530
ant on this appeal. First, he argues it was P.2d 585.) a After the initial interrogation,
has evinced no division and the statement
merely accompanies a requested rereading of
portions of the testimony or previous instructions. In the former case, the standard of reversible error presumably would be met, as
there would be little to indicate that the heightened potential for prejudice had not been realized.
21. The instruction reads in relevant part:
'The verdict must represent the considered
judgment of each juror. In order to return a
verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree
thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous.
"It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with
one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of
you must decide the case for yourself, but do so
only after an impartial consideration of the
evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course
of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opin566 P2d—22

ion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not
surrender your honest conviction as to the
weight or effect of evidence solely because of
the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the
mere purpose of returning a verdict.'* (ABA
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice, Stds. Relating to Trial by Jury (Approved Draft 1968) supra, commentary to std.
5.4(a), at p. 146, quoting ffom Mathes, op. cit.
supra, 27 F.R.D. 39, 97-98.)
This instruction, like CAUIC No. 17.40, may
be included in the initial instructions given to
the jury before they begin deliberations, or,
where appropriate, delivered as a supplemental
charge.
22. Since the use of A/ien-type instructions in
civil cases may be subject to different considerations, we do not decide whether such use is
also error.
23. The trial court did admit two statements
made by defendant after he had refused to
discuss the case. These were answers that
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defendant was permitted to meet with his
parents in private. Upon emerging from
the meeting, he agreed to show Kannisto
the location of his revolver. Defendant also
met briefly with an attorney, who, according to Kannisto, then told the police that it
was "okay to search for the gun." The
police drove defendant to his apartment,
where he pointed out the gun in a cabinet.
Defendant relies on our decision in Keithley. There the defendant made a highly
incriminating admission during an unlawful
interrogation, and we reasoned that his subsequent consent to a search "may well have
been influenced by knowledge he had already admitted involvement in the crime."
(Id. at p. 411, 118 Cal.Rptr. at p. 619, 530
?M at p. 587.) In this case, however, the
unlawfully obtained statements were ambiguous, if not completely benign.24 Moreover, in Keithley the police told the defendant, during the unlawful interview, that
they intended to obtain a search warrant—
after which the defendant promptly agreed
to the search. Although Kannisto continued subtly urging defendant to discuss the
case after the latter had refused a Miranda
waiver, the consent to search came only
after an intervening discussion between defendant and his parents. Thus, the record
presents no basis for holding that defendant's consent was the result of exploitation
of the earlier interrogation so as to require
application of the constitutional exclusionary policies of Wong Sun and Keithley.
[20,21] We further reject defendant's
claim that he was denied effective assist-
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defendant interjected in response to questions
directed by Kannisto to his partner, Sergeant
Fusselman. Kannisto testified as follows: "1
asked my partner, 'What type of gun was that,
do you know?'
"Q. [by deputy district attorney]. And,
what if anything did he reply?
"A. My partner didn't say anything. The
Defendant, who was seated to my right, replied
Thirty-Eight Special.'
**Q. Did you make any further inquiries
then?
"A. 1 then replied, 'Smith & Wesson?'
"The Defendant then replied, 'Thirty-Eight
Special, registered to me,' I believe.
"Q. Do you recall—referring to your notes,
if necessary—whether the specific type of gun
was mentioned by the Defendant?
"A. I believe he said, 'Charter Arms, registered to me.'"

ance of counsel in violation of his Sixth
Amendment rights. It is defendant's burden to show counsel's incompetence. (Pech
pie v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 613,'
114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058; People v.
Jenkins (1975) 13 Cal.3d 749, 753, 119 CaL
Rptr. 705, 532 P.2d 857.) "The proof of this
inadequacy or ineffectiveness must be a
demonstrable reality and not a speculative
matter." (People v. Stephenson (1974) 10
Cal.3d 652, 661, 111 Cal.Rptr. 556, 562, 517
P.2d 820, 826.) Here, all the evidence dis.';'^^"
closes is that defendant's attorney consent-*^^;
ed to the police search for the gun—and ; ^ | i :
presumably advised defendant to so con-^j|&<
sent—after meeting for approximately 10
minutes with his client. These bare facts
do not support a conclusion that counsel's
advice was incompetent. (Cf. Stanworth,^supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 608,114 Cal.Rptr. 250, *
522 P.2d 1058.) The revolver was regis-^
tered to defendant, and his attorney may
well have recognized that the police could
obtain a warrant to search for it if necesv
sary.
The judgment is reversed.
TOBRINER, Acting C. J., and RICH-1
ARDSON, J., WRIGHT, C. J. (Retired Chief J
Justice of the Supreme Court sitting undernjf
assignment by the Acting Chairman of the
Judicial Council), SULLIVAN (Retired As--:
sociate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting
under assignment by the Chairman of the v|
Judicial Council), and TAYLOR (Assigned .
by the Chairman of the Judicial Council),JJ., concur.
Kannisto admitted thai his partner may have^
had in his possession a copy of the registration^
card for defendant's gun, and that defendant,
could have been referring to the weapon noted^
on the card rather than the gun used in the^
slaying.
Defendant did not testify that he thought the j
questions were directed to him, and he does not.;
attack on appeal the admission of his response
es.

"•+**

24. The only potentially significant statemefltsj
suppressed at trial were defendant's vague *r*y
marks that "I never . . . disliked the ffl**2
or anything" and "I don't even remember i
brought it on." Nor can defendant's consent^
reasonably be termed a reaction to his havfaf i
interjected answers to Kannisto's queries'Oy
Sergeant Fusselman. (See fn. 23, ante.) &*pl
were we to consider, in this context, an attackj
on the admissibility of those admissions, i
prejudicial effect is questionable.

PEOPLE v. GAINER

Cal.

1011

Cite as I66P.2d997

CLARK, Justice, dissenting.
"Once a cause has been submitted to the
jury, and absent a discharge by consent, the
court bears the statutory responsibility of
assuring that a verdict is rendered 'unless,
at the expiration of such time as the court
may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears
that there is no reasonable probability that
the jury can agree.' (Pen. Code, § 1140.)
[H] The discharge of this responsibility necessarily requires that the court, in cases
where the jury has been unable to reach
agreement, make the indicated determination of 'reasonable probability' and, in cases
where in accordance with sound legal discretion [citations omitted] it is determined
that such a probability exists, that it take
appropriate action to encourage agreement." (People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d
810, 815, 69 Cal.Rptr. 297, 300, 442 P.2d 353,
356.)
The "Allen instruction" is an "appropriate action to encourage agreement." But
the majority opinion attacks two aspects of
the instruction.
First, the majority find fault with the
clause "the case must at some time be decided." However, this court understandably approved that statement in People v.
Carter, supra, 68 Cal.2d 810, 69 Cal.Rptr.
297, 442 P.2d 353. "[I]f the court determines that a reasonable probability of
agreement does exist, it may, generally
speaking, undertake certain measures calculated to encourage agreement. These include impressing the jury with the solemnity and importance of its task and reminding
it that in the event of a mistrial the case
will have to be retried, with attendant expenditure of money and time, and decided
upon similar if not identical evidence by a
jury of persons having qualifications equal
to those of the present jury." (Id. at pp.
815-816, 69 Cal.Rptr. at p. 301, 442 P.2d at
p. 357.)
Next, the majority attack the Allen instruction as introducing an "extraneous factor" into the jury's deliberations, "deflecting them] from their proper role as
triers of fact," insofar as it states that "a
dissenting juror should consider whether a
doubt in his or her own mind is a reasonable
one, which makes no impression on the
minds of so many men or women equally
honest, equally intelligent with himself or

herself." But the attack fails. To suggest
that someone reexamine his view because
the majority of those called upon to decide
a question have readied another conclusion
hardly introduces an ^'irrational" or "irrelevant" consideration. And it is certainly not
akin to instructing him to decide the question from his "prejudices or desire to go
home." For example, it is common for one
judge of this court to invite another to
reexamine his position upon a showing that
a majority of jurisdictions considering an
issue have taken the opposite position. Indeed, in this very case the majority opinion,
manifesting uneasiness in adopting the
view held by only a minority of jurisdictions
on the Allen question, cites the decisions of
three federal circuits and "at least 22
states" as evidence that its position represents the "modern trend." The appeal to
be "modern" is, of course, a separate consideration, one more appropriate to the fashion
industry than to the law. On the other
hand, the fact that a significant number of
jurisdictions disapprove of a practice is a
valid reason for reconsidering it. But, as
the Allen instruction emphasizes, one's decision must ultimately be one's own.
Having reconsidered the Allen instruction
because a majority of my colleagues appear
to disapprove of it, I ^till agree with Chief
Justice (then Circuit Judge) Burger that
"the Allen charge is a carefully balanced
method of reminding jurors of their elementary obligations, which they can lose
sight of during protracted deliberations. It
is perfectly valid to remind them that they
should give some thought to the views of
others and should reconsider their position
in light of those views. The charge as
given here did not require the jury to reach
a verdict but only reminded them of their
duty to attempt an accommodation. While
it suggests to the minority that they reconsider their position in light of a majority
having a different view, it reminds them
that they should not acquiesce in a verdict
which does not represent their own convictions." (Fulwood v. United States (1966)
125 U.S.App.D.C. 183, 369 F.2d 960, 962,
cert. den. 387 U.S. 934, 87 S.Ct. 2058, 18
L.Ed.2d 996.)
The judgment should be affirmed.
Rehearing denied; CLARK and RICHARDSON, JJ., dissenting

ADDENDUM E

INSTRUCTION NO.

'f

The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled
to the individual opinion of each jurotf.

It is the duty of

each of you after considering all the Evidence in the case, to
determine, if possible, the question oif guilt or innocence of
the defendant.

When you have reached 4 conclusion in that re-

spect, you should not change it merely because one or more or
all of your fellow jurors may have come to a different conclusion.

However, each juror should freely and fairly discuss

with his fellow jurors the evidence an4 the deduction to be
drawn therefrom.

If, after doing so, 4nY juror should be sat-

isfied that a conclusion first reached by him was wrong, he
unhesitatingly should abandon that original opinion and render
his verdict according to his final decision.

